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abstract: this paper examines how information provided by online reviews influences 
firms’ pricing strategy for repeat purchase products. It is commonly understood that 
online reviews can reduce consumer uncertainty about product characteristics and, 
therefore, have the potential to increase product demand and firm profits. However, 
when considering repeat purchase products, online reviews have an additional effect in 
that they can alter consumers’ propensity to switch among products, which can intensify 
price competition and lead to lower profits. the strength of these potentially offsetting 
effects depends on the informativeness of consumer reviews, which is a function of 
both objective review accuracy and the ability of consumers to obtain information from 
reviews when their idiosyncratic preferences over product characteristics might differ 
from the preferences of reviewers. the interplay of these competing effects results in 
an S-shaped relationship between the quality of reviews and firm profits. there exists 
an optimal level of consumer informedness from the firms’ perspective, and compet-
ing firms may have incentives to facilitate consumer reviews in some markets but not 
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in others. given firms’ strategic pricing, consumers may also be worse off as review 
informativeness increases.
Key words and pHrases: game-theoretic model, installed customer base, online product 
reviews, price competition, repeat purchase products, review informativeness.
in recent years, review web sites and onLine foruMs have become a low-cost channel 
for consumers to share product evaluations for a wide assortment of products. although 
these services provide many of the same functions as traditional word-of-mouth com-
munication [19], information exchanged online is anonymous and unprecedented 
in scale and reach. according to a survey conducted by Forrester reseach [3], as of 
October 2008, almost half of U.S. online consumers read product reviews at least once 
a month and 19 percent posted reviews online. Similar results were found in a survey 
done by Deloitte’s Consumer Products group [29]—almost two-thirds of consumers 
read consumer-written product reviews on the Internet, and 69 percent of them share 
the reviews with friends, family, or colleagues, thus amplifying their effect.
this opportunity for large-scale experience sharing among consumers and for 
information gathering by consumers has the effect of reducing uncertainty about the 
attributes of new products or services. this is especially true for products whose util-
ity cannot be fully known before purchase (such as experience goods), and when a 
consumer cannot try all products before making a purchase. In those cases, reviews 
can alter consumers’ buying behavior by enabling them to find products that fit their 
idiosyncratic preferences. Indeed, consumer-generated reviews are widely reported to 
directly influence consumer purchase decisions [29], to be more valuable than expert 
reviews [11, 30], to have a greater influence on purchasing decisions than traditional 
media [15], and to have a significant effect on offline purchase behavior [30].
In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model to examine how the ability of 
reviews to alter consumer informedness affects competitive pricing levels for repeat 
purchase products. By consumer informedness, we mean the extent to which consum-
ers are able to ascertain their idiosyncratic utility for a product they have not used. In 
our product reviews context, we operationalize this concept as the probability that a 
potential buyer receives a correct signal about the value of an untried product from read-
ing reviews of that product [9]. reviews that enable consumers to update their beliefs 
about utility to be closer to their true utility are described as informative, consistent 
with prior literature [6]. Our approach differs from prior research on product reviews, 
as we focus on repeat purchase products, which has not been examined previously, 
and build on prior research that allows the informativeness of reviews to vary due to 
idiosyncratic consumer preferences.
For firms, empowering consumers with more information can be a mixed blessing. 
On the one hand, increasing the amount of information available about a product or 
service may increase the willingness to pay on the part of consumers who have not 
tried the product or service, thus having the effect of increasing demand and firm profit. 
We call this effect demand enhancement. Demand enhancement has been the primary 
focus of prior work, including both analytical studies [1, 6, 27] and empirical studies 
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[7, 9, 13, 24]), and is potentially relevant to any type of product, regardless of whether 
it is a single or a repeat purchase.
On the other hand, repeat purchase products have the unique characteristic that 
consumer information can also influence product-switching behavior, generating two 
additional competitive effects not present for single-purchase products [5, 23, 34]. First, 
reviews can provide information about products that consumers have not previously 
tried, thereby reducing the switching cost that arises due to uncertainty about product 
value or characteristics. Positive reviews, in particular, can encourage switching, 
which will cause firms to compete more aggressively for customers that use competi-
tors’ products, thus lowering industry profits. We refer to this effect as switching risk 
reduction. Second, consumers can also receive unfavorable signals about the value 
of competitors’ products either because the reviews accurately reflect poor product 
quality or because of reviewer bias or error that leads a high-quality product to receive 
negative reviews. Negative reviews on competing products can enhance loyalty as they 
decrease the expected utility of switching, enabling firms to increase prices for their 
loyal customers and earn greater profits. We refer to this effect as (expected) switch‑
ing benefit reduction. the ultimate impact of consumer reviews on firm profitability 
for repeat purchase products is therefore contingent on the relative strength of these 
three effects, which are mediated by consumer preferences, quality uncertainty, and 
the informativeness of reviews.
reviews may not be fully informative for at least three reasons. First, reviewers may 
make errors or otherwise provide imperfect reviews. Second, product reviews may be 
influenced by deliberate forum manipulation in which firms pay reviewers to offer 
favorable reviews. However, prior analytical results [12, 26] suggest that this may not 
make reviews less informative because high-quality firms may have the greatest incen-
tives to engage in forum manipulation so that high-quality products still have higher 
ratings even when firms invest in forum manipulation.
Finally, even when reviews are truthful and fully accurate, they may still not be fully 
informative if preferences between reviewers and a review user differ. this may be 
especially important for experience goods and services where consumer fit is critical. 
For example, two people who went to the same restaurant and ordered the same food 
might report diametrically opposite evaluations due to innately personal preferences for 
service, portion size, spiciness, ambience, and so forth. For a consumer who does not 
know the preferences of these two anonymous reviewers, it is hard to determine which 
review correctly indicates the level of satisfaction that the consumer would experience 
with the food. therefore, there is always a chance that the consumer will receive an 
inaccurate signal from reading reviews. this is in contrast to traditional offline word 
of mouth, in which recommendations are provided by people whose preferences a 
consumer might understand (e.g., family or friends) or there is an opportunity for dialog 
to determine how the recommendation was arrived at. the tendency of online review 
sites to report summary measures (e.g., the average “star rating” at amazon.com) and 
for consumers to rely on these summary measures instead of reading the context or 
investigating the reviewers makes it even more likely that a mismatch in preferences 
introduces errors in consumer decisions when they utilize online reviews. Prior work on 
word-of-mouth communication suggests that the persuasiveness of a message depends 
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on the similarity between the source of the message and the reader [21, 28, 31, 33], and 
unobservable preference differences between online reviewers and consumers using 
online reviews have been demonstrated to adversely affect consumers [24].
Product reviews can have different effects on firm profitability depending on the 
level of review informativeness. In this paper, we find that in some cases a shift from 
no information to perfect information on product value can “level the playing field” 
between tried and untried products, increasing competition and lowering profits due 
to switching risk reduction. For the same market, a shift from no information to partial 
information through moderately informative reviews can lead to increased profits due 
to demand enhancement or switching benefit reduction.
thus, we show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between consumer informed-
ness and firm profitability; at low initial levels of informedness, switching benefit reduc‑
tion dominates and profits are increasing as reviews become more informative. When 
reviews are moderately informative, the switching risk reduction effect dominates, 
yielding a negative relationship between increased informativeness and profits. Very 
informative reviews can give rise to demand enhancement where firms benefit from 
increasing review accuracy, although profits may not reach the same levels experienced 
at lower levels of consumer informedness. Consequently, firms may have an optimal 
level of consumer informedness that maximizes their profits. this optimal level may 
be neither full information nor complete uninformedness. the key managerial insight 
from this observation is that firms might want to facilitate reviews in some markets 
but not others. the model described in this paper identifies the factors that affect this 
choice.
Literature review
tHis study contributes to tHe eMerging streaM of researcH on online product 
reviews. a number of empirical studies have documented the relationship between 
online product evaluations and product sales in different product categories. In the 
book industry, Chevalier and Mayzlin [7] demonstrated that the differences between 
consumer reviews posted on Barnes & Noble’s and amazon.com’s Web sites relate 
positively to the differences in book sales through the two sites. Several follow-up 
studies further examined the mediation effects of other factors on the relationship of 
reviews and sales, such as the preference discrepancy between early and later buyers 
[24], the matching in geographic location between reviewers and users of the reviews 
[17], and the “helpfulness” votes of the reviews [14]. In the motion picture and televi-
sion industries, godes and Mayzlin [18] showed a strong relationship between the 
popularity of a television show and the “dispersion” of conversations about the televi-
sion show across online consumer communities. Dellarocas et al. [13] incorporated the 
sentiment of word of mouth into a product diffusion model and found that the average 
rating of online consumer reviews is a better predictor of future movie revenues than 
other measures they considered. In contrast, Duan et al. [16] focused on the opposite 
causal relationship and found that the number of online reviews influences box office 
sales. In the beer industry, Clemons and his colleagues [10] found that the average rating 
of reviews and the strength of the most positive quartile of reviews have a significant 
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effect on the growth of craft beers. In the hotel industry, Clemons and gao [9] showed 
that consumers exhibit loss aversion when selecting among moderate-quality hotels. 
While these studies provide empirical evidence on the connection between reviews 
and sales, they generally do not consider optimal pricing or firm profitability, and 
most examine single-purchase products such as movies or books, rather than repeat 
purchase products or do not consider repeat purchase dynamics.
In contrast to abundant empirical work, analytical studies of online reviews have 
been limited. McFadden and train [27] found that when prices are assumed to be 
fixed, learning from others may delay the adoption of new products and enhance the 
sales of popular products while hurting the producers of niche products. Chen and 
Xie [6] showed that firms have incentive to help disseminate consumer reviews only 
when the firm’s target market is sufficiently large and that reviews affect firms’ optimal 
product assortment and information provision policies. Both of these studies focused 
on monopoly markets in which competition effects are not a concern. One recent se-
ries of studies considered the competitive effects of reviews [12, 26], but it examined 
single-purchase products with homogeneous consumer preferences and  stressed the 
incentives of competing firms to manipulate reviews, rather than characterizing the 
competitive implications of truthful but imperfect reviews.
Our work differs from the aforementioned studies by introducing competition, 
modeling the dynamics of repeat purchase, and examining the implications of het-
erogeneous consumer preferences and review informativeness. Some prior work did 
consider repeat purchase products (e.g., studies of television shows, beer, and hotels 
[9, 10, 18]), but repeat purchase dynamics typically played no role in these models. 
thus, the emphasis of prior work has been on characterizing the implications of what 
we have described as demand enhancement. By including the information effects of 
prior consumer product experience directly in the model, we can also examine how 
reviews enhance or reduce uncertainty-related switching risk or switching benefits, 
all of which are recognized in practice as important issues in competition among 
firms that have an existing customer base [5, 23, 34]. Incorporating the mediating 
effects of review informativeness further enables us to recognize for the first time 
the nonmonotonic effect of reviews on price competition as review informativeness 
increases. these issues may be especially important as online markets increasingly 
facilitate the trade of services and information goods in which consumers have long-
term purchase relationships and products may be horizontally differentiated and have 
strong experience goods characteristics. Markets with these characteristics include 
travel (especially hotels), health care, retail financial services, skin care and cosmet-
ics, restaurants, spas and salons, beers and wines, golf and health clubs, home and 
professional services, and tutoring and education centers, as well as products sold 
online with repeat purchase contracts, such as subscriptions.
Model
in tHis section, we introduce our ModeL and analyze the effects of reviews on con-
sumer choice, pricing strategies, firm profitability, and consumer surplus. Definitions 
of all notations used in our model appear in table 1.
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Model Setup
Consider two competing firms, a and B, producing two experience goods (a and B, 
respectively) at zero marginal cost. the two products are substitutes and are consumed 
in unit quantity. We assume q
i
j ( j ∈ {A, B}) measures the value of product j to consumer 
i, such as the effectiveness of a medicine or the voice quality of a wireless phone, 
which can be observed only after consumption. We allow q
i
j to be different across 
consumers; that is, different consumers may perceive the value of the same product 
differently. For tractability, we treat this type of consumer “fit” as dichotomous—q
i
j is 
modeled as a Bernoulli distribution, which takes value v with probability a and value 
0 with probability (1 – a). If q
i
j = v, we say product j matches consumer i ’s taste. If 
q
i
j = 0, we say product j does not match consumer i ’s taste. thus, a captures the po-
tential market size of each product, and also indicates the risk of getting a mismatched 
product for a random consumer. If a is large, then we are describing competition 
between “mass-market” products that are acceptable for most consumers (e.g., Coke 
and Pepsi). When a is small, we considering a market that consists of niche products 
(e.g., craft-brewed beer).
We assume q
i
A and q
i
B are independent and constant over time; that is, we allow the 
existence of consumers who like both product a and product B. to illustrate, consider 
two restaurants serving different food. Some consumers may enjoy only one of them, 
but other consumers may like them both. Similarly, if we consider two wireless ser-
table 1. Definitions of notations
Notation Definition
qi
j The value of product j to consumer i
v The value of a product if it matches a consumer’s preference
a The potential market size of matched consumers for each product
t Explicit switching cost
pn
j Firm j ’s price at period n
Dn
j Firm j ’s demand at period n
pn
j Firm j ’s profit at period n
d Intertemporal discount factor, which is assumed to equal 1
q Informativeness of reviews; 1/2 ≤ q ≤ 1
P+ The probability that a random consumer gets a positive (i.e., “matched”) 
signal from reviews on an untried product
P– The probability that a random consumer gets a negative (i.e., 
“unmatched”) signal from reviews on an untried product
X+v The expected value of the untried product if a consumer gets a positive 
(i.e., “matched”) signal from reviews
X–v The expected value of the untried product if a consumer gets a negative 
(i.e., “unmatched”) signal from reviews
a\1, a\2 Thresholds for a
T1, T2 Thresholds for t /v
q |1, q |2 Thresholds for q
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vice providers, depending on where the consumers live, some of them can have good 
voice quality only from one provider, but for others, both providers may deliver good 
voice quality. this approach provides a parsimonious model of consumer tastes, ac-
commodates a wide variety of actual market conditions, and is consistent with prior 
work (e.g., [6, 34]).
Because we are interested in characterizing competition among firms when consum-
ers have a purchase history, we assume that firms a and B have a symmetric installed 
customer base. Firm a’s customers have used product a before, but not product B. 
Similarly, firm B’s customers have used product B before, but not product a. this is 
consistent with optimal ex ante location in differentiated product competition (e.g., 
Hotelling [22] or Salop [32] models), although we do not model the initial product 
location decision explicitly. at a random time in the future, both firm a’s and firm B’s 
customers reenter the market a single time over the horizon of the model and select 
between product a and product B based on their prices at the time and expected product 
value. a consumer purchases at most one unit of either product at each purchase oc-
casion. If neither product provides a nonnegative expected utility for a consumer, he 
or she may exit the market without making any purchase. It should be noted that our 
single-reentry assumption ensures that no consumer making a choice has previously 
experienced both products. While this is restrictive, it is unlikely to be a practical 
concern as this simply rules out markets in which it is viable for consumers to try 
all products first before settling on a long-term purchase. In such a market, reviews 
cannot play any role because they provide no incremental value over the consumers’ 
own experiences. this assumption is consistent with prior work on competition in 
repeat purchase products (e.g., [34]).
Consumers incur an explicit cost t when switching products. Because we are mod-
eling the relationship between value uncertainty and product choice, we treat the 
explicit switching cost parameterized by t as a characteristic of the product or market, 
unrelated to consumer informedness. For example, it takes time, effort, or direct ex-
penses to set up a new account, to get acquainted with a new service provider, or to 
terminate an existing relationship or contract [5, 23]. the remaining risk or benefits 
of switching products that arise from value uncertainty of untried products are cap-
tured in our model endogenously as part of the consumer choice process. thus, t can 
be interpreted as the “explicit” switching cost faced by a consumer even when there 
is no value uncertainty and the consumers are fully informed. the relative size of t 
over v determines the relative importance of the explicit switching cost compared to 
product value. If consumer i is in firm j ’s customer base (and so has used product j 
before), the net surplus or utility from consuming product j for consumer i is q
i
j – p j. 
If consumer i is not in firm j ’s customer base (and so has not used product j before), 
the net surplus or utility from consuming product j for consumer i is q
i
j – t – p j. Here, 
p j is the price charged by firm j.
to model the situation in which firms can adjust price at any time, we subdivide 
time into an infinite number of small time periods. these time periods are indexed 
by n (n = 0, 1, 2, ...). Without loss of generality, we normalize the market size in each 
period as 1. Firms a and B take turns choosing prices. the alternating move assumption 
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is meant to capture the idea that a firm is able to respond to the price change of the 
competing firm with minimal but nonnegligible delay.1 accordingly, in odd-numbered 
periods n, firm a chooses its price, which remains unchanged until period n + 2. 
Similarly, firm B chooses its prices only in even-numbered periods. Consumers (who 
purchased a or B in the past) reenter the market with equal probability in any period. 
In period n, consumers who reenter the market in this period make purchase decisions 
based on the current prices p
n
A and p
n
B, and each firm selects the optimal price to opti-
mize its intertemporal profit S∞
s = 0
d sp j
n+s
, where p
n
j is firm j ’s profit in period n, and d is 
the intertemporal discount factor. Due to technological innovations in retail pricing, 
such as bar codes, online retailing, and competitive information systems, firms can 
adjust prices and respond to competitors’ prices rapidly. Consequently, we assume that 
the time that elapses between consecutive periods is minimal and thus the discount 
factor d can be very close to 1 from the perspective of a price setter. accordingly, for 
simplicity, we assume d = 1 in the following analysis.
Consumer reviews and Product Valuation
Consumers know exactly their valuation of the product they bought before, but not the 
value of the other, untried product. Product reviews written by others can therefore 
provide information about the value of the untried product. From reading product 
reviews, a consumer obtains a signal of product value for the product he or she did 
not buy previously. Consistent with the binary nature of preferences, consumers can 
obtain a binary signal of whether the product fits their preferences (“matched”) or 
not (“unmatched”).
Product reviews can be noisy or uninformative in the sense that the signal provided 
by these reviews might mislead a “matched” consumer to consider the product to be 
“unmatched” before purchase and vice versa. this uninformativeness can be caused 
either by imperfection in the review process, such as reviewer error or forum manipula-
tion [12, 26], or by differences in consumer preferences [24]. Higher informativeness 
in our model corresponds to better information as defined by Blackwell [4], and our 
consumer reasoning process is consistent with Bayesian updating. as in Chen and 
Xie’s [6] approach, we define the informativeness of the reviews as the probability 
of receiving a correct signal about the value of the other product from these reviews, 
denoted by parameter q. If the product matches a consumer’s preference, he or she 
will receive a “matched” signal from reviews with probability q and an “unmatched” 
signal from reviews with probability (1 – q). Similarly, if the product does not match a 
consumer’s preference, he or she will receive an “unmatched” signal with probability 
q and a “matched” signal with probability (1 – q).2
Let P
+
 represent the probability that a randomly chosen consumer (the product 
matches his or her taste with probability a) gets a “matched” (positive) signal from 
reviews, and let P
–
 denote the probability that the consumer gets an “unmatched” 
(negative) signal. then P
+
 = aq + (1 – a)(1 – q) and P
–
 = a(1 – q) + (1 – a)q. Natu-
rally, we have P
+
 + P
–
 = 1. We assume that the signal provided by the reviews is 
always somewhat informative in the sense that a “correct” signal is more likely than 
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an incorrect signal (otherwise the consumer can simply reverse the signal he or she 
gets, interpreting a “matched” signal as indicating “unmatched”). thus, without loss 
of generality, we assume 1/2 ≤ q ≤ 1,3 which ensures that the signal is more likely to 
be correct. If q = 1, the reviews are perfectly informative, equivalent to the perfect 
information scenario in which the consumers know the value of the untried product 
perfectly before purchase. If q = 1/2, the reviews are completely uninformative (i.e., 
consumers are not able to get any additional information from the signal because the 
signal has an equal probability of being correct or incorrect), equivalent to the no-
reviews scenario in which the consumers receive no information on the value of the 
untried product from the reviews.
Consistent with prior studies [6, 34], we assume that consumers and firms have 
common knowledge of the parameters t, v, a, and q. If a consumer gets a “matched” 
signal from the reviews, he or she knows there is a probability (1 – a)(1 – q) that the 
untried product does not match his or her taste and he or she simply received an inac-
curate signal. applying Bayes’s rule, the consumer knows that the untried product 
will indeed match his or her preference with a probability of 
a
a a
θ
θ θ+ −( ) −( )1 1 .
the consumer therefore adjusts his or her expected value for the untried product 
conditional on receiving the “matched” (positive) signal as 
X v
a
a a
v+ = + −( ) −( )
θ
θ θ1 1
.
Similarly, if the consumer receives an “unmatched” signal, he or she knows the prob-
ability that the untried product matches his or her preference is 
1
1 1
−( )
−( ) + −( )
a
a a
θ
θ θ
,
which yields an expected value of
X v
a
a a
v− =
−( )
−( ) + −( )
1
1 1
θ
θ θ
.
thus, consumers can be divided into eight segments, based on their prior product 
purchase (a or B), whether the product that they tried matches their preference (value 
of the current product is v or 0), and the review signal that they receive from reading 
reviews on the untried product (positive or negative). For ease of exposition, we have 
numbered each of these segments 1 through 8 and will refer to the segment numbers 
in the following discussion. table 2 presents the segment number, the segment size, 
and the consumers’ expected utility from consuming product a and product B. to il-
lustrate the segmentation, segment 1 represents a consumer who previously purchased 
product a, whose preferences match product a, and who receives a “matched” signal 
for product B.
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Impact of Product reviews on Firm Profitability
to examine the impact of product reviews on firm profitability, we first derive each 
firm’s demand and profit function. In each period, the consumers who arrive in this 
period make a decision to buy the same product they used before, buy the other untried 
product, or buy neither product. a consumer will choose the same product that he 
or she tried before only if the product provides a utility greater than (or equal to) the 
expected utility of switching to the untried product and the surplus received from the 
purchase is nonnegative. For example, for a consumer in segment 1 in table 2, he or she 
will choose product a again if v – p
n
A ≥ X
+
v – p
n
B – t and v – p
n
A ≥ 0, choose product B 
if v – p
n
A < X
+
v – p
n
B – t and X
+
v – p
n
B – t ≥ 0, or choose neither product if v – p
n
A < 0 
and X
+
v – p
n
B – t < 0. repeating this analysis for all the other segments described in 
table 2 and combining all the segments purchasing from firm j for each pair of p
n
A and 
p
n
B yields the following demand for firm j ’s product in period n (denoted as D
n
j ):
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where j, k ∈ {A, B} and k ≠ j. Firm j ’s profit in period n is p
n
j = p
n
jD
n
j. Each firm selects 
the optimal price in each period to optimize its intertemporal profit S∞
s = 0
d sp j
n+s
, taking 
into account its competitor’s reaction in future periods.
the equilibrium of our price competition game under this demand structure is 
presented in result 1. Our results suggest that the profit-maximizing equilibrium 
price is symmetric across firms and constant over time (i.e., p
n
A = p
n
B = p, where p is a 
price independent of n). as shown in appendix a, any other equilibrium, if it exists, 
is less profitable. the equilibrium is derived under the condition t /v ≥ 1/4 to preserve 
tractability (see appendix a). thus, we focus on a setting where the explicit switching 
cost (i.e., the switching cost unrelated to consumer informedness) is significant and 
firms can effectively use price to improve customer retention. this condition leaves 
out markets that are extremely competitive irrespective of information conditions; 
that is, we derive our results for the region where review informativeness can play a 
substantial role in competition. In appendix Figure a1, we present the results for two 
numerical examples in the other parameter region (t /v < 1/4), which further confirm 
that our results are not limited to the selected parameter region.
Result 1: When product value is uncertain to consumers before purchase, the 
explicit switching cost (unrelated to consumer informedness) is nonnegligible 
(t /v ≥ 1/4), and reviews are available with different informativeness (1/ 2 ≤ q ≤ 1); 
equilibrium prices, demands, and profits can be described as follows:
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and
X
+
v – t < T
P
 < v.
See appendix a for the proof of result 1 and the functional form for T
P
 (omitted 
here due to its complexity).
result 1 suggests that if the explicit switching cost is high (t /v > T
2
), each firm 
charges either v or T
P
 (a price lower than v) to target only its own satisfied customers: 
firm a targets segments 1 and 2 and firm B targets segments 5 and 6. If the explicit 
switching cost is low (t /v ≤ T
2
), each firm lowers its price to X
+
v – t to attract addition-
ally unsatisfied customers of the competing firm who have not tried their product but 
receive a positive signal from reviews: firm a attracts segment 7 (unsatisfied customers 
of firm B who receive a positive signal for firm a) in addition to segments 1 and 2, 
and firm B attracts segment 3 in addition to segments 5 and 6. Figure 1 graphically 
depicts the relationship between the ratio of explicit switching cost and product 
value (t /v) and equilibrium price presented in result 1 for four examples: q = 0.5 
(completely uninformative reviews), q = 0.7 (low-informativeness reviews), q = 0.9 
(high-informativeness reviews), and q = 1 (perfectly informative reviews).
the rationale behind result 1 can be explained as follows. If each firm targets only 
its own satisfied consumers (segments 1 and 2 for firm a; segments 5 and 6 for firm B), 
it can charge a high price due to their uncertainty-driven loyalty and explicit switching 
costs. If one firm, say, firm a, lowers its price, it has two offsetting effects—it expands 
demand by capturing the customers of firm B (segments 5 and 7), but loses profits by 
discounting to loyal customers (segments 1 and 2). When the explicit switching cost 
is large, the discount needed to attract new customers is so large that the revenue gain 
from additional customers is more than offset by the revenue loss to existing custom-
ers (this corresponds to t /v ≥ T
1
, the white regions in Figure 1). When the explicit 
switching cost is in the middle range (T
2
 < t /v < T
1
), both firms still target only their 
returning loyal consumers but have to charge a lower price to defend their existing 
customer base (T
P
 < v). When the explicit switching cost is low (t /v ≤ T
2
), the revenue 
gain from expanding demand is higher than the revenue loss from the loyal segments, 
and both firms lower their price to attract the unsatisfied consumers of the competing 
firm who receive a “matched” signal from the reviews of the untried product.
the positions of the thresholds, T
1
 and T
2
, vary with review informativeness (q). as 
shown in Figure 1, near the boundaries we have the intuitive results that low-infor-
mativeness reviews (q = 0.7) affect behavior similarly to completely uninformative 
reviews (q = 0.5) and high-informativeness reviews (q = 0.9) are similar to perfectly 
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Figure 1. graphical Presentation of Price Equilibrium Under Different Levels of review 
Informativeness (Under Condition t /v ≥ 1/4)
Notes: White areas: p
n
j = v, D
n
j = a / 2, p
n
j = av / 2; segments 1 and 2 buy from firm a, 
segments 5 and 6 buy from firm B, the other segments buy from neither firm. Light gray 
areas: p
n
j = T
P 
, D
n
j = a / 2, p
n
j = aT
P
 / 2; segments 1 and 2 buy from firm a, segments 5 and 
6 buy from firm B, the other segments buy from neither firm. Dark gray areas: p
n
j = X
+
v – t, 
D
n
j = a / 2 + (1 – a)P
+
 / 2, p
n
j = (X
+
v – t)(a + (1 – a)P
+
)/2; segments 1, 2, and 7 buy from 
firm a, segments 3, 5, and 6 buy from firm B, the other segments buy from neither firm.
(a) Completely uninformative review 
(q = 0.5)
(b) Low-informativeness review (q = 0.7)
(c) High-informativeness review (q = 0.9) (d) Perfectly informative review (q = 1)
informative reviews (q = 1). However, surprisingly, as q increases from 0.5 (completely 
uninformative) to 1 (perfectly informative), the change in the threshold function T
1
 
is not monotonic. the shape of this relationship is moderated by the potential market 
size of each product. to illustrate, we depict the relationship between firm profitability 
and review informativeness for three representative types of products—one for niche 
products (a = 0.4, Figure 2a), one for middle-range products (a = 0.75, Figure 2b), and 
another for mass-market products (a = 0.9, Figure 2c). In all three cases, we observe 
the nonmonotonic change in firm profit as review informativeness changes: firm profit 
is in an S-shaped relationship with review informativeness. Figure 2 is created using 
t /v = 1/4, but as we show later, similar patterns are observed for other values of t /v.
the rationale behind the nonmonotonic pattern can be explained as follows. Increas-
ing review informativeness exerts three conflicting effects on firm profitability. First, 
it reduces the value uncertainty of the untried product and increases the willingness to 
pay of the consumers and thus has the potential to expand firm demand and increase 
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Figure 2. Firm Profit in Each Period Is in an S-Shaped relationship with review 
Informativeness for the Example of t /v = 1/4
(a) Niche products (a = 0.4) (b) Middle-range products (a = 0.75)
(c) Mass-market products (a = 0.9)
firm profit (demand enhancement). For example, as review informativeness q increases, 
firm a can target segments 5 and 7 with a higher price (because X
+
 increases with q). 
Second, if consumers get positive signals from the reviews on the untried product, an 
increase in review informativeness provides information that enables consumers to learn 
and switch to the untried product, and hence it may decrease consumers’ loyalty to the 
product they have tried before and lower the loyalty premium that firms can charge 
to returning consumers (switching risk reduction). For example, for the consumers in 
segment 1, the relative willingness to pay for product a versus product B is lowered 
as q increases, and so firm a may be forced to lower the price to prevent these con-
sumers from switching. third, if consumers get negative signals from the reviews on 
the untried product, an increase in review informativeness enlarges the gap between 
the willingness to pay for the tried product versus that for the untried product. this 
increased gap reduces the likelihood of these consumers responding to a price cut of-
fered on the untried product, and thus reinforces the firm’s ability to charge a loyalty 
premium (switching benefit reduction). For example, for the consumers in segment 2, as 
q increases, poor-quality reviews increase the relative willingness to pay for product a 
versus product B, so firm a has less of a need to compete through a lower price to retain 
its existing customers and firm B has less an incentive to try to capture them.
the ultimate impact of an increase in review informativeness on firm profitability is 
thus contingent on the relative strength of these three conflicting effects, which further 
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depends on the magnitude of review informativeness q and the potential market size 
a. If review informativeness is low, an initial increase in review informativeness has 
a larger impact on the switching benefit reduction effect, potentially leading to higher 
profit. Whether it leads to an actual profit increase depends on whether there is an op-
portunity for a profitable price increase, which in turn depends on the potential market 
size of each product. If a is small, the untried product is likely to be an “unmatched” 
product for most consumers; hence, without reviews, the consumers’ incentive to switch 
is low. thus, firms are able to charge v (the highest possible price to charge) when 
no reviews are available, and so the switching benefit reduction effect cannot further 
increase price and profit. this explains the flat region in Figures 2a and 2b where an 
increase in review informativeness initially does not change firm profit. However, if 
a is large, the likelihood of the untried product matching a consumer’s preference is 
high. Both firms have to charge a price lower than v to defend their own customers 
when review informativeness is low. thus, as a result of the switching benefit reduction 
effect, an increase in review informativeness enables the firms to increase the price 
and earn higher profits until the price reaches v. this explains the profit increase in 
Figure 2c. as review informativeness further increases, for all a, product uncertainty 
is gradually resolved and the customers increasingly consider switching products; 
that is, the switching risk reduction effect will start to dominate, causing firm profit 
to decrease. Eventually, all the consumers find their preferred product as reviews be-
come close to being perfectly informative, and most of the effect is in the expansion 
of demand (demand enhancement effect). thus, the interplay of these three conflicting 
effects overall gives rise to an S-shaped relationship between review informativeness 
and firm profit.
While the S-shaped relationship is common for products of all potential market sizes 
(a), the value of a determines whether firm profit eventually is higher under perfect 
information (or highly informative reviews) than under no information (i.e., completely 
uninformative reviews); that is, while a rising curve is observed at high values of q 
for all values of a in Figure 2, it eventually crosses the profit level in the absence of 
reviews (the dotted line) only for the niche products in Figure 2a. this is because 
product fit matters most for niche products. Not only are consumers more willing to 
pay for a product that fits compared to a product with uncertain value, the firms are 
also more likely to be sufficiently differentiated so that they can extract almost all of 
this additional fit benefit, which is not possible, however, for mass-market products 
because of intensified competition in the large overlapped consumer segment for 
which the two firms compete under a large a. thus, firms generally prefer informative 
reviews for niche products.
the relationships described above are affected by the explicit switching cost t (i.e., 
the switching cost unrelated to consumer informedness). When the explicit switch-
ing cost is sufficiently low (1/4 ≤ t /v ≤ 1/3), then the effects described earlier prevail. 
When the explicit switching cost is high (t /v ≥ 1/3), the region where the switching 
benefit reduction effect increases profits for mass-market products (higher a) as review 
informativeness increases (similar to Figure 2c) is eliminated because the explicit 
switching cost provides an effective barrier to price competition. In this case, for all 
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a, when reviews are not available, switching is not a concern and both firms already 
charge v, and therefore the switching benefit reduction effect cannot further improve 
firm profit. these relationships are depicted in Figures 3a and 3b for two representa-
tive values of t /v, 0.25 (low) and 0.35 (high). these results are also summarized in 
result 2 (see appendix B for the derivation of these results).
Result 2: Effects of consumer reviews of different informativeness on firm profit-
ability relative to the scenario of no reviews (under condition t /v ≥ 1/4)
Market Condition
Impact of reviews with Different Informativeness 
(1/2 ≤ q ≤ 1)
Niche products a < a\
1
Low-informativeness reviews (1/2 ≤ q ≤ q |
2
) do not 
affect profit 
High-informativeness reviews (q |
2
 < q < q |
1
) lead to 
lower profit 
Extremely high-informativeness reviews (q |
1
 < q ≤ 1) 
lead to higher profit 
Middle-range products 
a\
1
 < a < a\
2
Low-informativeness reviews (1/2 ≤ q ≤ q |
2
) do not 
affect profit
High-informativeness reviews (q |
2
 < q ≤ 1) lead to 
lower profit
Mass-market products 
a > a\
2
Low switching cost 
t / v < 1/3
Low-informativeness reviews (1/2 ≤ q < q |
2
) lead to 
higher profit
High-informativeness reviews (q |
2
 < q ≤ 1) lead to 
lower profit
High switching cost 
t / v ≥ 1/3
reviews do not affect profit 
a
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See appendix B for threshold values q |
1
 and q |
2 
.
Consistent with our earlier discussion on Figure 2, two results are evident from Fig-
ure 3 and result 2. First, imperfect information provided through reviews can increase, 
decrease, or have no effect on firm profit compared to the scenario with no reviews. 
Second, as the informativeness of reviews increases, the impact of reviews on firm 
profit relative to the scenario of no reviews changes nonmonotonically and can be either 
higher or lower than under full information. For example, in Figure 3a, for the case 
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of a = 0.4 (niche products), perfect information (q = 1) leads to higher firm profit, but 
lower-informativeness reviews (q < q |
1
) either lead to lower firm profit or do not affect 
firm profit, compared to the no-reviews scenario; for the case of a = 0.9 (mass-market 
products with a low switching cost), perfect information (q = 1) decreases firm profit, 
but low-informativeness reviews (q < q |
2
) increase profit compared to the no-reviews 
scenario. If we draw a graph for a particular value of a and t /v (t /v ≥ 1/4), we observe 
a similar S-shaped relationship between firm profit and review informativeness as 
shown in Figure 2, except in the region of a > a\
2
 and t /v ≥ 1/3, where reviews do not 
affect profit. thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition (Review Informativeness and Firm Profitability):4 The profits of 
competing firms with installed customer bases and repeat purchase products 
are either not affected by reviews or have an S‑shaped relationship with review 
informativeness, suggesting a nonmonotonic impact of review informativeness 
on firm profitability.
the nonmonotonic effect of reviews on firm profitability suggests that there may ex-
ist an “interior” optimal level of consumer informedness that is neither fully informed 
nor completely uninformed. according to Figures 2 and 3, this nonlinear relationship 
varies for different types of products and therefore suggests product-specific implica-
tions for firms’ policy on facilitating consumer reviews.
For niche products (see Figure 2a and Figure 3 where a < a\
1
), firms make the high-
est profit if the consumers are fully informed. In those markets, because of the strong 
demand enhancement effect, highly informative product information can enable firms 
to reach consumers whom they were not able to reach otherwise without risking a price 
war. therefore, firms should make every effort to encourage informative reviews. this 
encouragement is especially important if the informativeness of reviews falls in the 
Figure 3. Effects of Consumer reviews on Firm Profitability Compared to the No-review 
Scenario for Different Values of a and q for two representative Examples: t / v = 0.25 and 
t / v = 0.35 
Notes: results are similar for other values of t / v : the low switching cost case 
(1/4 ≤ t / v < 1/3) is similar to Figure 3a and the high switching cost case (t / v ≥ 1/3) is similar 
to Figure 3b. White areas: reviews do not affect firm profit. Light gray areas: reviews lead 
to lower firm profit compared to the no-reviews scenario. Dark gray areas: reviews lead to 
higher firm profit compared to the no-reviews scenario.
(a) Low switching cost (t / v = 0.25) (b) High switching cost (t / v = 0.35)
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region of q |
2
 < q < q |
1
 because firms make the lowest profit in this case (lower than both 
the no-reviews and the perfect-information scenarios) due to switching risk reduction. 
For mass-market products (see Figures 2c and 3a where a > a\
2
), however, the highest 
profit is “interior,” achieved at a level of consumer information that is neither fully un-
informed nor fully informed. For those products, due to the expected switching benefit 
reduction, a modest amount of product information (low-informativeness reviews with 
q < q |
2
) available to the consumers further enlarges the difference between the value of 
the tried product and the expected value of the untried product for the consumers likely 
responding to competitive price undercutting. this increased information advantage 
enables the firms to charge a higher price. this effect, however, can be reversed if 
the amount of product information exceeds a certain threshold (q > q |
2
). Correspond-
ingly, firms should facilitate reviews for those products only if the informativeness of 
reviews is within the optimal range (q < q |
2
). For middle-range products (see Figures 2b 
and 3 where a\
1
 < a < a\
2
), reviews with low informativeness (q < q |
2
) are not powerful 
enough to change the dynamics of competition (as discussed before, switching ben‑
efit reduction does not increase profit in this case because both firms already charge 
price v when no reviews are available). Highly informative reviews (q > q |
2
), however, 
have the potential to lower firm profit due to switching risk reduction. as discussed 
before, the diverging effects of highly informative reviews on niche products (small 
a) versus popular products (large a) are driven by the firms’ inability to extract all the 
demand enhancement benefit to entirely offset the switching risk reduction effect due 
to intensified firm competition in the overlapped consumer segment for which the two 
firms compete under large a.
these results are derived for the setting where the explicit switching cost is non-
negligible (t /v ≥ 1/4). appendix Figure a1 shows numerical results for the setting 
where this condition does not hold (t /v = 0.1) and shows that our basic conclusion 
that maximal profits are achieved at the intermediate levels of informativeness for 
mass-market products is not sensitive to this tractability assumption. Our result that 
imperfect information lowers profits for niche products also holds. thus, we have the 
following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Optimal Review Informativeness from the Firms’ Perspective): The 
optimal level of consumer informedness from the firms’ perspective varies by 
product and need not be at the boundary (full informativeness or full uninforma‑
tiveness). Firms generally prefer high consumer informedness for niche products 
but low consumer informedness for mass‑market products.
Impact of Consumer reviews on Consumer Surplus
From the consumers’ point of view, competition can benefit consumers by lowering 
prices. as a result, if reviews with low informativeness can relax competition and 
increase firms’ profits, they may hurt consumer surplus, even if consumers know the 
informativeness of reviews (q) and make fully rational decisions.5 this result comple-
ments previous findings that review bias (uninformative reviews due to heterogeneity 
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of preferences) can hurt consumer surplus if the consumers are not aware of the bias 
or do not have enough information to correct the bias [24]. On the other hand, if the 
informativeness of reviews is high, firms receive lower profits due to increased com-
petition but consumer surplus may be increased. From this perspective, the impact of 
consumer reviews on consumer surplus is mainly opposite to the impact of consumer 
reviews on firm profitability. there is one exception, however; when a is small (a < a\
1
) 
and reviews are extremely informative (q > q |
1
), both firm profit and consumer surplus 
are increased as a result of reviews. this exception arises because in that region, the 
firms make higher profits due to expanded demand (targeting additionally the unsatis-
fied consumers of the competing firm) and the consumers benefit from lowered prices 
driven by intensified competition. thus, highly accurate reviews in markets for niche 
products can be especially beneficial, enabling the customers to find a product that 
fits their preferences and enabling the firms to sell highly differentiated products and 
still capture a significant portion of the value created. results about the impact of 
consumer reviews on consumer surplus are summarized in result 3:
Result 3: Effects of consumer reviews of different informativeness on consumer 
surplus relative to the scenario of no reviews (under condition t /v ≥ 1/4)
Market Condition
Impact of reviews with Different Informativeness 
(1/2 ≤ q ≤ 1)
Niche products or 
middle-range products 
a < a\
2
Low-informativeness reviews (1/2 ≤ q ≤ q |
2
) do not 
affect consumer surplus 
High-informativeness reviews (q |
2
 < q ≤ 1) lead to 
higher consumer surplus
Mass-market products 
a > a\
2
Low switching cost 
t / v < 1/3
Low-informativeness reviews (1/2 ≤ q < q |
2
) lead to 
lower consumer surplus
High-informativeness reviews (q |
2
 < q ≤ 1) lead to 
higher consumer surplus
High switching cost 
t / v ≥ 1/3
reviews do not affect consumer surplus 
as review informativeness increases, consumer surplus also shows a nonmonotonic 
behavior. to illustrate, we depict the relationship between consumer surplus and re-
view informativeness for three representative types of products in Figure 4. Because 
firm profitability and consumer surplus respond to price competition in an opposite 
manner, Figures 2 and 4 generally show opposite trends as review informativeness 
increases. For example, in Figure 2a, as review informativeness increases, firm profit 
first keeps constant, then decreases, and finally increases, whereas in Figure 4a, as 
review informativeness increases, consumer surplus first keeps constant, then increases, 
and finally decreases. there is a noticeable difference in Figure 4 that a discontinu-
ous jump occurs when review informativeness increases beyond a certain threshold 
in all three graphs. that threshold is the level of review informativeness at which the 
PrODUCt rEVIEWS aND COMPEtItION FOr rEPEat PUrCHaSE PrODUCtS     29
firms make equal profits by targeting only their own satisfied customers or by target-
ing additionally the unsatisfied consumers of the competing firm. Beyond that point, 
because both firms additionally target the unsatisfied consumers of the competing firm, 
considerably more consumers are served, yielding a significant increase in consumer 
surplus. then as review informativeness continues to increase, the firms are able 
to charge higher prices without losing demand as a result of the dominant demand 
enhancement effect as discussed in the previous section for Figure 2. this explains 
why, beyond that point, as review informativeness increases, firm profits increase but 
consumer surplus decreases.
according to Figure 4, consumer surplus is highest when the level of review infor-
mativeness is just above the point where firms start to target the unsatisfied consumers 
of the competing firm. at that point, the consumers are neither fully informed nor 
completely uninformed; that is, even though consumers are generally better off with 
high-informativeness reviews (compared to the no-review scenario), full informative-
ness does not necessarily lead to highest consumer surplus given firms’ strategic pricing. 
thus, according to result 3 and Figure 4, we can develop the following corollary:
Corollary 2 (Review Informativeness and Consumer Surplus): The optimal level 
of consumer informedness from the consumers’ perspective varies by product and 
need not be at the boundary (full informativeness). Consumers generally benefit 
from high‑informativeness reviews but not low‑informativeness reviews.
Figure 4. Consumer Surplus in Each Period Is in an S-Shaped relationship with review 
Informativeness for the Example of t / v = 1/4 
(a) Niche products (a = 0.4) (b) Middle-range products (a = 0.75)
(c) Mass-market products (a = 0.9)
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Conclusions and Discussion
wHiLe product quaLity uncertainty can aLLow firms to charge high prices to returning 
customers for repeat purchase products, uncertainty reduction caused by experience 
sharing among consumers does not necessarily encourage price competition and lower 
firm profit. For incumbent firms that sell competing repeat purchase products, the 
ultimate impact of consumer reviews depends on the relative strength of three effects 
that these reviews have on each firm’s profit. Demand enhancement due to increased 
information about product fit may attract new buyers outside the current customer base, 
increasing total industry profits. Switching risk reduction due to positive information 
about untried competing products lowers the uncertainty-related switching cost for 
the current customers, increasing price competition. Switching benefit reduction from 
negative information about an untried product can solidify a firm’s customer base and 
decrease price competition. these conflicting effects can thus give rise to an S-shaped 
relationship between review informativeness and firm profits. there is an optimal level 
of review informativeness from the firms’ perspective, and this level can be different 
in different markets depending on the potential market size of each product and the 
explicit switching cost. Consumers generally benefit from more informative reviews, 
although only for niche products are the interests of consumers and the interests of 
producers aligned. given firms’ strategic pricing, consumers can actually be worse 
off by having low-informativeness reviews than if they had nothing, or benefit more 
from less than fully informative reviews than if they were fully informed, as the 
benefit of being better informed about product attributes under some circumstances 
can be partially offset by the high prices set by firms due to relaxed competition or 
enhanced demand.
the principal strategic implications of our results are that firms should recognize the 
role that review informativeness plays in price competition in devising their pricing 
and promotion strategies and should consider making investments that affect review 
informativeness when the level of informativeness deviates from the optimum. Sellers 
of niche products, both individually and collectively, can benefit from increasing review 
informativeness, but only if reviews can be highly informative. In niche markets that 
are not covered by existing specialized review sites, firms could consider partnering 
with competitors or distributors to develop a specialized review service or to support 
existing general review sites such as Epinions.com or amazon.com if existing measures 
suggest that consumers find these reviews informative. Measurement of consumer 
informativeness could rely on existing measures already in review facilities (such as 
“helpfulness votes”; see, e.g., [14]) or direct measurement through surveys or focus 
groups. Support could take the form of financial support through advertising, or opera-
tional support by providing product samples or test equipment to critical reviewers. In 
some cases, manufacturers could consider offering proprietary reviews on their Web 
sites (as is the practice of Dell and Sony), although concerns about credibility will 
likely be stronger in manufacturer-sponsored rather than third-party reviews even if 
the content is identical. Producers of mass-market products with broad appeal have 
substantially different incentives, as review informativeness generally shifts surplus 
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from producers to consumers; firms can expect a robust market for third-party review 
services and can privately benefit from ensuring that their own products are well posi-
tioned, but do not gain from a general increase in consumer informedness. Mass-market 
firms that have products with contractual or inherent switching costs (e.g., wireless 
phones for the former and retail banking services for the latter) may be indifferent to 
reviews. Moreover, third-party sites are less interested in providing reviews in these 
markets because consumers receive little benefit from reviews.
Our analysis is intended to be largely prescriptive rather than descriptive, and the 
factors that drive price competition in our models are likely to be highly context spe-
cific, making broad empirical study challenging. However, there is evidence that the 
factors that we identify, such as the strength of idiosyncratic preferences and explicit 
switching cost, show considerable variation across markets, giving rise to variation 
in the optimal levels of review informativeness in our model. For instance, our prior 
discussion already highlights beer, luxury hotels, specialty restaurants, and skin-care 
products as niche market products for which highly informative reviews can be use-
ful. But soft drinks, Web hosts, online bookstores, and online banking services can 
be viewed as mass-market products. Some products can be either, depending on the 
context. Wireless services are mass-market products in well-covered urban areas and 
niche products in suburban or rural areas where coverage is sparse. the distinction is 
straightforward: Some markets are such that almost any product could satisfy almost 
any consumer, whereas other markets are such that the fit between a specific product 
and a specific consumer is very important. there is also variation in explicit switching 
costs. Some products we discussed exhibit high switching costs due to complementary 
product compatibility (skin care), contracts (wireless services), or the actual effort 
required in switching (banking and Web hosting services), whereas most of the other 
products (beer, hotels, bookstores) that we describe have low explicit switching costs. 
thus, it is clear that the exogenous parameters that drive our results are well defined 
both theoretically and practically and do show variation in real markets. Moreover, 
because it is possible to characterize different markets as having different combina-
tions of our exogenous parameters, there is the possibility of empirically validating our 
predictions by comparing the influence of reviews across different product markets. 
these empirical tests could be further enhanced if they were done concurrently with 
an exogenous change in the informativeness of reviews, such as the introduction of 
a new review service or modifications of existing review services, by moving from 
single to multidimensional product ratings, introducing reviewer feedback, changing 
the way reviewer profiles are presented, or providing advanced search features.
We can also find support for our major propositions in existing empirical work on 
online product reviews. there have been three prior empirical studies considering repeat 
purchase products, focusing on beer, luxury hotels, and online retailers (bookstores) [9, 
10, 20]. In the market for craft beers, retailers report significant improvements in the 
ability to market highly differentiated and high-priced beers based on reviews provided 
by rateBeer (www.ratebeer.com), a high-traffic specialty review site dedicated to this 
market [8]. a notable characteristic of rateBeer is that it emphasizes review accuracy 
by using technology and social processes to detect fraudulent or uninformed reviews 
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and providing extensive information on both products and reviewer characteristics 
[8]. Studies of both beer [10] and luxury hotels [9] have also shown that the consum-
ers in these markets are most responsive to the number and complexity of reviews in 
the upper and lower ends of the rating distribution, also suggesting the importance 
of review informativeness in these markets. However, neither of these markets shows 
evidence that these highly informative reviews have increased price competition [2, 8]. 
In contrast, prior work has shown that online reviews do facilitate price competition 
in mass-market products such as online retail [20], and it has been argued that some 
review sites, such as tripadvisor (www.tripadvisor.com), play a significant role in 
encouraging price competition among middle-market hotels (another mass-market 
product), largely to the benefit of travel sites such as Hotels.com (www.hotels.com) 
[9]. Finally, our model results are consistent with the observation that niche market 
products tend to be covered by specialty review sites such as rateBeer for beer, Zagat 
Survey (www.zagat.com) for restaurants, and Makeupalley (http://makeupalley.com) 
for cosmetics, while mass-market products are principally covered by generalist re-
view sites (e.g., Epinions). In addition, generalist review sites often provide limited 
coverage for niche products if they cover niche products at all. this is consistent with 
the especially high value of informative reviews for niche products. the economic 
trade-off between having the broad reach of a generalist review site and having the 
narrow reach of a specialized site appears to favor specialized sites only for niche 
markets. thus, our major propositions are consistent with the institutional structure 
of online review services.
While we focus specifically on consumer reviews, our results extend to any forum 
that provides consumer information, such as blogs or third-party reviews.6 to the 
extent that all these forums provide greater consumer information, our results pro-
vide insight into their effect on competition. However, without studying the relative 
informativeness of these other media, we cannot determine the extent to which firms 
should selectively embrace some types of media but not others.
there are also several limitations with our modeling approach that call for future 
research. there are a few technical assumptions embedded in our model for tractability 
that could be relaxed. First, under the single-reentry assumption, consumer experimen-
tation is not considered in our model—that is, consumers cannot try both products and 
pick the one with the better fit. this assumption is common in the literature (e.g., [34]) 
because it narrows the focus to products for which reviews can play a role, such as 
when it is costly to experiment or when consumer tastes may change over time. relax-
ing the single-reentry assumption provides more opportunities for firms to compete, 
which should increase the degree of price competition but is unlikely to change the 
structural characteristics of our results. Similarly, we do not consider the search costs 
to obtain reviews. relaxing this assumption would likely lead consumers to be less 
informed, but retain most of the structure of our results. However, examining search 
is considerably more interesting if firms can control consumer search costs, as this 
would add a new dimension of competition.
In addition, while this paper set out to examine the impact of consumer reviews on 
price competition between firms, we did not examine how firms might respond to online 
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review sites by changing product design. For instance, can firms alter products to have 
greater or less complexity to affect review informativeness in a favorable direction? 
alternatively, there could also be an important role for quality investment that could 
create a separate dimension of differentiation in quality as well as fit that could either 
soften or intensify competition. Finally, field studies in cooperation with industrial 
partners can also be promising to better understand how our model predictions can 
be effectively applied in practice.
notes
1. a similar assumption is used by Maskin and tirole [25] to model oligopoly competition. 
We also examined the alternative simultaneous move assumption under which firms choose 
price at the same time. this alternative assumption may lead to mixed-strategy equilibrium in 
certain parameter regions, but the model still yields the same qualitative conclusions. therefore, 
we are confident that our results presented in this paper are not sensitive to this alternating 
move assumption.
2. We assume q is independent of a. While these two parameters can potentially both be 
affected by product characteristics such as product complexity, they are distinct concepts—both 
a niche product and a mass-market product can be simple and readily describable in reviews 
or can be too complex to be reviewed in an informative way. By having a two-dimensional 
characterization, our model is more general and allows for mapping other concepts of product 
distinction into this space.
3. If q is less than 1/2, a consumer is more likely to receive an incorrect signal than a correct 
one—that is, more than a 50 percent chance a matched consumer will receive an “unmatched” 
signal and an unmatched consumer will receive a “matched” signal. Knowing this, the consumer 
will simply interpret a “matched” signal as meaning “unmatched” and vice versa, so that the 
probability of being signaled correctly (1 – q) will be greater than 50 percent. therefore, the 
case of q between 0 and 1/2 is exactly symmetric to the case of q between 1/2 and 1.
4. Note that support for our main proposition and its associated corollaries relies on ana-
lytical results for the region with t /v ≥ 1/4 and numerical analysis for the remainder of the 
parameter space.
5. although low-informativeness reviews may result in a surplus loss for consumers as a 
group, a consumer still has an individual incentive to read low-informativeness reviews. reviews 
always provide some information, so rational consumers will examine reviews before making 
purchases and benefit by making better purchase decisions for a given set of prices and prod-
ucts. Paradoxically, this seemingly beneficial behavior for individual consumers may result in 
a higher price paid by all consumers in equilibrium due to decreased competition.
6. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
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appendix a. Proof of result 1
we first utiLiZe tHe perfect-inforMation scenario (i.e., reviews are completely infor-
mative with q = 1) to explain in detail how to derive equilibrium and then follow the 
same procedure to solve equilibrium for the scenario 1/2 ≤ q < 1. the equilibrium is 
first derived assuming that the equilibrium price is symmetric across firms and con-
stant over time. We then show that any other equilibrium, if it exists, is less profitable. 
Define an indicator function: 
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 x AA
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Scenario of q = 1
assume in equilibrium that both firms charge p* in all periods. then, according to 
table 2, in each period, each firm’s profit under q = 1 is 
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In this analysis, we focus on the parameter regions where the equilibrium price is 
no lower than v – t under perfect information (i.e., p* ≥ v – t). Under this condition, 
we capture both possibilities in Equation (a1) while preserving tractability. Figure a1 
shows numerical results for the setting where this condition does not hold, which shows 
that our results are not sensitive to this tractability assumption. the equilibrium price 
maximizes profit taking into account firm reaction in future periods. 
a firm may deviate in period n in two ways: undercut its competitor by t to “steal” 
additional customers (call it “deviation B1”) or deviate to a higher price if p* < v (call it 
“deviation B2”). We first derive the condition under which one period deviation (devi-
ate in period n and then return to equilibrium price in period n + 2) is unprofitable and 
36     LI, HItt, aND ZHaNg
then illustrate why one period deviation is incentive compatible for the deviating firm. 
the equilibrium price is derived by maximizing profit while deterring deviation B1. 
We then show that the derived equilibrium also depresses deviation B2. Without loss 
of generality, assume that firm B is the deviating firm.
For deviation B1, if firm B undercuts firm a by t (i.e., charges p* – t – ε, where ε 
is infinitely close to zero) in period n and returns to p* in period n + 2, then in period 
n + 1, firm a can either continue to charge equilibrium price p* or lower its price to 
p* – ε to prevent its consumers from switching to firm B. Firm a’s profits for these 
two options are, respectively,
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Figure A1. Numerical Demonstration on the relationship Between Firm Profit in Each 
Period and review Informativeness for the Example of t /v = 0.1 
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Because the latter option provides a higher profit, firm a will lower its price to 
p* – ε in period n + 1 and return to p* in period n + 3. thus, if firm B deviates, it earns 
(p* – t – ε)a in period n, earns 
p t a a* − −( ) −( )ε 2
2
in period n + 1, and earns the equilibrium profit
p a a a a I pv t v
*
,
*2 1
2
−( ) − −( ) ( )( )−( ]
in all the periods that follow. therefore, firm B will not deviate if the following con-
dition holds: 
p t a
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Under condition (a2), neither firm finds it profitable to undercut the competitor in 
equilibrium. In addition, if one firm charges a price lower than p*, the other firm will 
find it unprofitable to undercut as well. therefore, it is optimal for firm B to return to 
the equilibrium price instead of further undercutting firm a in period n + 2, because 
firm a’s price is lower than p* in that period (i.e., one period deviation is incentive 
compatible for the deviating firm). 
Under condition (a2), the equilibrium price that is no lower than v – t and maxi-
mizes profit,
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thus, the region where the equilibrium price is no lower than v – t for all possible 
values of a is t /v ≥ 1/4.
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this equilibrium also deters deviation B2. When p* = v – t (under condition 
1/4 ≤ t /v ≤ (2 – a)2/(8 – 5a + a2)), a firm makes a higher profit in each period by charg-
ing p* than charging any price higher than v – t. When v – t < p* < v (under condition 
(2 – a2)/(8 – 5a + a2) < t /v < (2 – a)/(4 – a)), if firm B deviates to a price higher than 
p* in period n and returns to p* in period n + 2, firm a makes the highest profit by 
undercutting firm B by t in period n + 1 and returning to p* in period n + 3. thus, if 
firm B deviates, it earns at most av / 2 in period n, a(1 – a)v / 2 in period n + 1, and the 
equilibrium profit in all the periods that follow, which is less than the total profit it 
makes if it stays in equilibrium under condition (2 – a2)/(8 – 5a + a2) < t /v < (2 – a)/
(4 – a). In this case, it is again incentive compatible for firm B to return to the equi-
librium price in period n + 2—as we just showed, any price higher than p* in this case 
leads to lower profit; it is also unprofitable to further undercut firm a provided that 
firm a’s price in that period is lower than p*, as discussed earlier. 
In any other equilibrium, if it exists, the equilibrium price in each period has to 
satisfy condition (a2). Otherwise, a firm can earn a higher profit by undercutting the 
competitor by t and returns to that price in the next period. the equilibrium described 
in condition (a3) produces the highest profit for each firm in each period given in 
condition (a2) and therefore is the optimal equilibrium.
Scenario of 1/2 ≤ q < 1
We now follow the same procedure described in the previous section to derive equilib-
rium for the scenario of 1/2 ≤ q < 1. We assume in equilibrium that both firms charge 
p* in all periods. then, according to table 2, in each period, each firm’s profit is 
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a firm may deviate in period n in two ways: first, undercut its competitor by 
v – (X
+
v – t) or v – (X
–
v – t) to “steal” additional customers; second, deviate to a higher 
price if p* < v. Similar to the previous section, we can derive the conditions under 
which the first potential deviation is unprofitable as
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We then can derive the equilibrium price that maximizes profit 
p a a P a P I p a P I pX v t v X v t
*
,
*
,
*+ −( ) − −( ) ( ) + −( ) ( )( )+ + −( ] − −( ]+ −1 1 1
2
0
given these conditions and t /v ≥ 1/4 as
 
p
v  
t
v
T
T  T
t
v
T
X v t  
t
v
T
P
*
,
=
≥
< <
− ≤








 +
if
if
if
1
2 1
2
 
(a4)
where 
T X
a
a P P
 X
a
a1
2
2 2
2
2
= −
−( ) + − +








+
+ +
−Max ,
T X
a a P P
a P P P a P P
2 2 2
2 2
4 3 2 2 2
= −
−( ) +( )
−( ) + + − −( )( )+
+ +
+ + + + +
and
T
a P P v t X v
a P
 
a v t X v
a
P =
−( ) +( ) + −( )
−( )
+( ) + −( )
−




+ + +
+
−Min
2 2
2
2
2
,





>
−( ) +( ) − −( ) +( ) −( )
+
+ + − + + +
+
if  
t
v
a P aP X a a P P X
P aP
2 2 2 2 2 1
4 2 + + + +
+ +
+
+( ) + − +( )( )
+( ) + −( )
− −( )
+( )
1 4 2
2
2 2
2
2P a P P
aP v t X v
a P
 
a
Min ,
v t X v
a
 
t
v
a P aP X a a P P
+ −( )
−








≤
−( ) +( ) − −( ) +
−
+ + − +
2
2 2 2 2 2
if
+ +
+ + + + +
( ) −( )
+ +( ) + − +( )( )















1
4 2 1 4 22
X
P aP P a P P
.
Following the same logic as described in the previous section, we can also show in 
this scenario that one period deviation is incentive compatible for the deviating firm, 
that the equilibrium described in Equation (a4) discourages the second potential 
deviation, and that any other equilibrium, if it exits, is less profitable.
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appendix B. Derivation of result 2 (Under Condition t /v ≥ 1/4)
tHe iMpact of reviews on firM profit is derived by comparing results in Lemma 1 with 
the scenario where no reviews are available (equivalent to the scenario of q = 1/2) for 
different market conditions as follows.
If t /v < a2/(2 + a) (i.e., a > (t + (t 2 + 8tv)1/2)/2v), this region appears only if t /v ≤ 1/3), 
then according to Lemma 1, in the no-reviews scenario, both firms charge
2
2
+( ) + −( )
−
a v t av
a
and earn
a a v t av
a
2
4 2
+( ) + −( )
−
in each period. If reviews are available, then there exist three possibilities as suggested 
by Lemma 2. If t /v ≥ T
1
, then firms charge v and earn a higher profit. If T
2
 < t /v < T
1
, 
then firms charge T
P
 (between X
+
v – t and v) and earn a higher profit if their per period 
profit (T
P 
a / 2) is higher than 
a a v t av
a
2
4 2
+( ) + −( )
−
,
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If t /v ≤ T
2
, then firms charge X
+
v – t and earn less profit than in the no-reviews 
scenario. Denote η
1
 as 
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.
then in this region, reviews increase profit if q < η
1
 and decrease profit otherwise. 
If t /v > a2/(2 + a) (i.e., a < (t + (t 2 + 8tv)1/2)/2v), according to Lemma 1, in the 
no-reviews scenario, both firms charge v and earn av/2 in each period. If reviews 
are available, then according to Lemma 2, there are three possibilities. If t /v ≥ T
1
, 
then firms charge v and earn the same profit. If T
2
 < t /v < T
1
, then firms charge T
P
 
(between X
+
v – t and v) and earn less profit. If t /v ≤ T
2
, then firms charge X
+
v – t and 
earn higher profit if 
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Solving t /v ≥ T
1
 suggests that 
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then in this region, reviews increase profit if q > q |
1
, decrease profit if η
2
 < q < q |
1
, and 
do not affect profit if q ≤ η
2
. 
Define q |
2
 as Max{η
1
, η
2
}. q |
1
 is higher than 1 if a is higher than (v – 2t)/(v – t), which 
is smaller than (t + (t 2 + 8tv)1/2)/2v. q |
2
 is higher than 1 if a is higher than 2(v – 2t)/
(v – t), which is smaller than (t + (t 2 + 8tv)1/2)/2v if t /v > 1/3. these conditions deter-
mine whether the aforementioned regions of q appear for different values of a and 
t /v. thus, we have in total four segments in result 2.

